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Abstract
In this paper, we study the number of equilibria of the replicator-mutator dynamics for
both deterministic and random multi-player two-strategy evolutionary games. For deter-
ministic games, using Decartes’ rule of signs, we provide a formula to compute the number
of equilibria in multi-player games via the number of change of signs in the coefficients of a
polynomial. For two-player social dilemmas (namely, the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Snowdrift, Stag
Hunt, and Harmony), we characterize (stable) equilibrium points and analytically calculate
the probability of having a certain number of equilibria when the payoff entries are uniformly
distributed. For multi-player random games whose payoffs are independently distributed ac-
cording to a normal distribution, by employing techniques from random polynomial theory,
we compute the expected or average number of internal equilibria. In addition, we perform
extensive simulations by sampling and averaging over a large number of possible payoff ma-
trices to compare with and illustrate analytical results. Numerical simulations also suggest
several interesting behaviour of the average number of equilibria when the number of players
is sufficiently large or when the mutation is sufficiently small. In general, we observe that
introducing mutation results in a larger average number of internal equilibria than when mu-
tation is absent, implying that mutation leads to larger behavioural diversity in dynamical
systems. Interestingly, this number is largest when mutation is rare rather than when it is
frequent.
1 Introduction
The replicator-mutator dynamics has become a powerful mathematical framework for the
modelling and analysis of complex biological, economical and social systems. It has been em-
ployed in the study of, among other applications, population genetics [Had81], autocatalytic re-
action networks [SS92], language evolution [NKN01], the evolution of cooperation [IFN05] and
dynamics of behavior in social networks [Olf07]. Suppose that in an infinite population there are
n types/strategies S1, · · · , Sn whose frequencies are, respectively, x1, · · · , xn. These types undergo
selection; that is, the reproduction rate of each type, Si, is determined by its fitness or average
payoff, fi, which is obtained from interacting with other individuals in the population. The in-
teraction of the individuals in the population is carried out within randomly selected groups of d
participants (for some integer d). That is, they play and obtain their payoffs from a d-player game,
defined by a payoff matrix. We consider here symmetric games where the payoffs do not depend
on the ordering of the players in a group. Mutation is included by adding the possibility that
individuals spontaneously change from one strategy to another, which is modeled via a mutation
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2matrix, Q = (qji), j, i ∈ {1, · · · , n}. The entry qji denotes the probability that a player of type Sj
changes its type or strategy to Si. The mutation matrix Q is a row-stochastic matrix, i.e.,
n∑
j=1
qji = 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
The replicator-mutator is then given by, see e.g. [KNN01, Kom04, KL10, PCNeL12]
x˙i =
n∑
j=1
xjfj(x)qji − xif¯(x) =: gi(x), i = 1, . . . , n, (1)
where x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) and f¯(x) =
∑n
i=1 xifi(x) denotes the average fitness of the whole
population. The replicator dynamics is a special instance of (1) when the mutation matrix is the
identity matrix.
In this paper we are interested in properties of the equilibrium points of the replicator-mutator
dynamics (1). Note that we are concerned with dynamic equilibria almost exclusively. There might
be a dynamic equilibrium which is not a Nash equilibrium of the game. These dynamic equilibrium
points are solutions of the following system of polynomial equations{
gi(x) = 0, i = 1, . . . , n− 1,∑n
i=1 xi = 1.
(2)
The second condition in (2), that is the preservation of the sum of the frequencies, is due to the term
xif¯(x) in (1). The first condition imposes relations on the fitnesses. We consider both deterministic
and random games where the entries of the payoff matrix are respectively deterministic and random
variables. Typical examples of deterministic games include pairwise social dilemma and public
goods games that have been studied intensively in the literature, see e.g. [HDMHS02, SPL06,
HPL17, WKJT15, PJR+17]. On the other hand, random evolutionary games are suitable for
modelling social and biological systems in which very limited information is available, or where
the environment changes so rapidly and frequently that one cannot describe the payoffs of their
inhabitants’ interactions [FH92, GRLD09, GF13]. Simulations and analysis of random games
are also helpful for the prediction of the bifurcation of the replicator-mutator dynamics [KNN01,
Kom04, PCNeL12]. Here we are mainly interested in the number of equilibria in deterministic
games and the expected number of equilibria in random games, which allow predicting the levels
of social and biological diversity as well as the overall complexity in a dynamical system. As in
[KNN01, Kom04, PCNeL12], we consider an independent mutation model that corresponds to a
uniform random probability of mutating to alternative strategies as follows:
qij =
q
n− 1 , i 6= j, qii = 1− q, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n. (3)
In particular, for two-strategy games (i.e., when n = 2), the above relations read
q12 = q21 = q, q11 = q22 = 1− q.
The parameter q represents the strength of mutation and ranges from 0 to 1 − 1n . The two
boundaries have interesting interpretation in the context of dynamics of learning [Kom04]: for
q = 0 (which corresponds to the replicator dynamics), learning is perfect and learners always end
up speaking the grammar of their teachers. In this case, vertices of the unit hypercube in Rn are
always equilibria. On the other hand, for q = n−1n , the chance for the learner to pick any grammar
is the same for all grammars and is independent of the teacher’s grammar. In this case, there always
exists a uniform equilibrium x = (1/n, . . . , 1/n) (cf. Remark 2.4). Equilibrium properties of the
replicator dynamics, particularly the probability of observing the maximal number of equilibrium
points, the attainability and stability of the patterns of evolutionarily stable strategies have been
studied intensively in the literature [BCV97, Bro00, GT10, HTG12, GT14]. More recently, we
3have provided explicit formulas for the computation of the expected number and the distribution
of internal equilibria for the replicator dynamics with multi-player games by employing techniques
from both classical and random polynomial theory [DH15, DH16, DTH18, DTH19]. For the
replicator dynamics, that is when there is no mutation, the first condition in (2) means that all
the strategies have the same fitness which is also the average fitness of the whole population.
This benign property is no longer valid in the presence of mutation making the mathematical
analysis harder. In a general d-player n-strategy game, each gi is a multivariate polynomial of
degree d + 1, thus (2) is a system of multivariate polynomial equations. In particular, for a
two-player two-strategy game, which is the simplest case, (2) reduces to a cubic equation whose
coefficients depend on the payoff entries and the mutation strength. For larger d and n, solving (2)
analytically is generally impossible according to Abel’s impossibility theorem. Nevertheless, there
has been a considerable effort to study equilibrium properties of the replicator-mutator dynamics in
deterministic two-player games, see for instance [KNN01, Kom04, KL10, PCNeL12]. In particular,
with the mutation strength q as the bifurcation parameter, bifurcations and limit cycles have been
shown for various classes of fitness matrices [KL10, PCNeL12]. However, equilibrium properties
for multi-player games and for random games are much less understood although in the previously
mentioned papers, random games were employed to detect and predict certain behaviour of (1).
In this paper, we explore further connections between classical/random polynomial theory
and evolutionary game theory developed in [DH15, DH16, DTH18, DTH19] to study equilibrium
properties of the replicator-mutator dynamics. For deterministic games, by using Decartes’ rule of
signs and its recent developments, we are able to fully characterize the equilibrium properties for
social dilemmas. In addition, we provide a method to compute the number of equilibria in multi-
player games via the sign changes of the coefficients of a polynomial. For two-player social dilemma
games, we calculate the probability of having a certain number of equilibria when the payoff
entries are uniformly distributed. For multi-player two-strategy random games whose payoffs
are independently distributed according to a normal distribution, we obtain explicit formulas to
compute the expected number of equilibria by relating it to the expected number of positive roots
of a random polynomial. Interestingly, due to mutation, the coefficients of the random polynomial
become correlated as opposed to the replicator dynamics where they are independent. The case q =
0.5 turns out to be special and needs different treatment. We also perform extensive simulations
by sampling and averaging over a large number of possible payoff matrices, to compare with
and illustrate analytical results. Moreover, numerical simulations also show interesting behaviour
of the expected number of equilibria when the number of players tends to infinity or when the
mutation goes to zero. It would be challenging to analyze these asymptotic behaviours rigorously
and we leave it for future work.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we study deterministic games.
In Section 3 we consider random games. Finally, we provide further discussions and outlook in
Section 4.
2 Properties of equilibrium points: deterministic games
In this section, we study properties of equilibrium points of deterministic games. We start
with some preliminary results on the roots of a general polynomial that will be used in the
subsequent sections. We then focus on two-player games, particularly the social dilemmas. Finally,
by employing Decartes’ rule of signs and its recent improvement [Av10] we derive a formula to
compute the number of equilibria of multi-player games.
2.1 Preliminaries
This section presents some preliminary results on the roots of a polynomial that will be used
in the subsequent sections. The following lemma is an elementary characterization of stability of
equilibrium points of a dynamical system where the right hand side is a polynomial.
4Lemma 2.1. Consider a dynamical system x˙ = P (x) = anx
n+ . . .+a1x+a0 where a0, . . . , an are
real coefficients. Suppose that P has n real roots x1 < x2 < . . . < xn. Then the stability of these
equilibrium points is alternatively switched, that is for all i = 1, . . . n− 1, if xi is stable then xi+1
is unstable and vice versa. In particular, consider the dynamics x˙ = P (x) = Ax3 +Bx2 +Cx+D.
Suppose that P (x) has three real roots x1 < x2 < x3. Then
(i) If A > 0 then x2 is stable; x1 and x3 are unstable.
(ii) If A < 0 then x2 is unstable; x1 and x3 are stable.
Proof. We prove the general case since the cubic case is a direct consequence. Since P has n real
roots x1, . . . , xn, we have P (x) = an
∏n
i=1(x− xi). Thus
P ′(x) = an
n∑
i=1
∏
j 6=i
(x− xj).
Therefore for any i = 1, . . . , n, we obtain
P ′(xi) = an
∏
j 6=i
(xi − xj).
Since x1 < . . . < xn, we have for any i = 1, . . . , n− 1,
sign(P ′(xi)) = sign
(
an(−1)n−i
)
and sign(P ′(xi+1)) = sign
(
an(−1)n−i−1
)
= −sign(P ′(xi)),
which implies that P ′(xi) and P ′(xi+1) have alternative signs. Thus their stability is alternative
switched.
The following lemma specifies the location of roots of a quadratic equation whose proof is
omitted.
Lemma 2.2. Consider a quadratic equation f(x) = ax2 + bx+ c. Define ∆ = b2 − 4ac. Then
(i) Exactly one of the roots lies in a given interval (m1,m2) if f(m1)f(m2) < 0.
(ii) Both roots are greater than a given number m if
∆ ≥ 0, − b
2a
> m and af(m) > 0.
(iii) Both roots are less than a given number m if
∆ ≥ 0, − b
2a
< m and af(m) > 0.
(iv) Both roots lie in a given interval (m1,m2) if
∆ ≥ 0, m1 < − b
2a
< m2, af(m1) > 0 and af(m2) > 0.
2.2 Two-player games
We first consider the case of two-player games. Let {ajk}nj,k=1 be the payoff matrix where j is
the strategy of the focal player and k is that of the opponent. Then the average payoff of strategy
j and of the whole population are given respectively by
fj(x) =
n∑
k=1
xkajk and f¯(x) =
n∑
j=1
xjfj(x) =
n∑
j,k=1
ajkxjxk. (4)
5Substituting (4) into (1) we obtain
x˙i =
n∑
j,k=1
qjixjxkajk − xi
n∑
j,k=1
ajkxjxk. (5)
In particular, for two-player two-strategy games the replicator-mutator equation is
x˙ = q11a11x
2 + q11x(1− x)a12 + q21x(1− x)a21 + q21a22(1− x)2
− x
(
a11x
2 + (a12 + a21)x(1− x) + a22(1− x)2
)
, (6)
where x is the frequency of the first strategy and 1− x is the frequency of the second one. Using
the identities q11 = q22 = 1− q, q12 = q21 = q, Equation (6) becomes
x˙ =
(
a12 + a21 − a11 − a22
)
x3 +
(
a11 − a21 − 2(a12 − a22) + q(a22 + a12 − a11 − a21)
)
x2
+
(
a12 − a22 + q(a21 − a12 − 2a22)
)
x+ qa22. (7)
The properties of equilibrium points for the case q = 0 are well-understood, see e.g. [GT14].
Thus we consider 0 < q ≤ 1/2. In addition, equilibria of (7) and their stability for the case
a11 = a22 = 1, a12 ≤ a21 ≤ 1 have been studied in [KL10].
Two-player social dilemma games. We first consider two-player social dilemma games. We
adopt the following parameterized payoff matrix to study the full space of two-player social
dilemma games where the first strategy is cooperator and second is defector [SPL06, WKJT15],
a11 = 1; a22 = 0; 0 ≤ a21 = T ≤ 2 and −1 ≤ a12 = S ≤ 1, that covers the following games
(i) the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD): 2 ≥ T > 1 > 0 > S ≥ −1,
(ii) the Snow-Drift (SD) game: 2 ≥ T > 1 > S > 0,
(iii) the Stag Hunt (SH) game: 1 > T > 0 > S ≥ −1,
(iv) the Harmony (H) game: 1 > T ≥ 0, 1 ≥ S > 0.
Note that in the SD-game: S + T > 1, in the SH-game: S + T < 1. By simplifying the right hand
side of (7), equilibria of a social dilemma game are roots in the interval [0, 1] of the following cubic
equation (
T + S − 1
)
x3 +
(
1− T − 2S + q(S − 1− T )
)
x2 +
(
S + q(T − S)
)
x = 0. (8)
It follows that x = 0 is always an equilibrium. If q = 12 then the above equation has two solutions
x1 =
1
2 and x2 =
T+S
T+S−1 . In PD, SD and H-games, x2 6∈ (0, 1), thus they have two equilibria
x0 = 0 and x1 =
1
2 . In the SH-game: if T+S < 0 then the game has three equilibria x0 = 0, x1 =
1
2
and 0 < x2 < 1; if T + S ≥ 0 then the game has only two equilibria x0 = 0, x1 = 12 .
We consider q 6= 12 . For non-zero equilibrium points we solve the following quadratic equation
h(x) := (T + S − 1)x2 + (1− T − 2S + q(S − 1− T ))x+ S + q(T − S) =: ax2 + bx+ c = 0. (9)
Note that we have h(1) = −q < 0 for all the above games. In the SD-game, since T + S − 1 > 0
and h(0) = S + q(T − S) = qT + S(1 − q) > 0, h is a quadratic and has two positive roots
0 < x1 < 1 < x2. Thus the SD-game always has two equilibria: an unstable one x0 = 0, and a
stable one 0 < x1 < 1. For the H-game,
6(i) If S + T = 1 then h becomes h(x) = −(2Tq + 1 − T )x + (2qT + 1 − T ) − q and has a root
x = 1− q2Tq+1−T . If q(1− 2T ) < 1− T then x ∈ (0, 1) and the game has two equilibria: an
unstable one x0 = 0, and a stable one 0 < x1 < 1. If q(1− 2T ) ≤ 1− T then x < 0 and the
game has only one equilibrium x = 0.
(ii) if S + T > 1, then since h(0) = S + q(T − S) = qT + S(1 − q) > 0, h has two roots
0 < x1 < 1 < x2; thus the game has two equilibria: an unstable one x0 = 0, and a stable one
0 < x1 < 1.
(iii) if S + T < 1 then since h(0) = S + q(T − S) = qT + S(1 − q) > 0, h has two roots
x2 < 0 < x1 < 1; thus the game has two equilibria: an unstable one x0 = 0 and a stable one
0 < x1 < 1.
Thus the H-game has either 1 equilibrium or 2 equilibria. The analysis for the SH-game and the
PD-game is more involved since we do not know the sign of h(0).
SH-game. Since T + S < 1, h is always a quadratic polynomial. Define
∆ = (1− T − 2S + q(S − 1− T ))2 − 4(T + S − 1)(S + q(T − S)), (10)
m := − b
2a
=
T + 2S − 1− q(S − T − 1)
2(T + S − 1) = 1 +
1− T + q(T + 1− S)
2(T + S − 1) . (11)
Since T +S− 1 < 0 and 1−T + q(T + 1−S) > 0, we have m < 1. Applying Lemma 2.2, it results
in the following cases:
(i) If ∆ < 0, then the game has only one equilibrium x0 = 0 which is stable if S + q(T − S) < 0
and is unstable if S + q(T − S) > 0.
(ii) If ∆ ≥ 0 and h(0) > 0, then the game has two equilibria: an unstable one x0 = 0 and a
stable one 0 < x1 < 1.
(iii) If ∆ ≥ 0 and h(0) < 0 and − b2a > 0 then the game has three equilibria x0 = 0 < x1 < x2 < 1
where x0 and x2 are stable while x1 is unstable.
(iv) If ∆ ≥ 0 and h(0) < 0 and − b2a < 0 then the game has only one stable equilibrium x0 = 0.
PD-game. It remains to consider the PD-game. If S + T = 1 then h becomes h(x) =
−(2Tq + 1− T )x+ (2qT + 1− T )− q and has a root x¯ = 1− q2Tq+1−T . Thus the game has only
one equilibrium x0 = 0 if x¯ 6∈ (0, 1) and has two equilibria if x¯ ∈ (0, 1). If S + T 6= 1, then h is a
quadratic polynomial. Let ∆ and m be defined as in (10)-(11). According to Lemma 2.2, we have
the following cases:
(i) If ∆ < 0 then h has no real roots. Thus the game only has one equilibrium x0 = 0.
(ii) If ∆ ≥ 0 and h(0) = qT + S(1− q) > 0 then h has exactly one root in (0, 1). Thus the game
has two equilibria.
(iii) If ∆ ≥ 0, 0 < T+2S−1−q(S−T−1)2(T+S−1) < 1, ah(0) = (T+S−1)(qT+S(1−q)) > 0, and ah(1) =
−q(T + S − 1) > 0 then h has two roots in (0, 1). Thus the game has three equilibria.
(iv) In other cases, h has two roots but do not belong to (0, 1). Thus the game has only one
equilibrium at x0 = 0.
For comparison, we consider the case q = 0. Equation (8) becomes
(T + S − 1)x3 + (1− T − 2S)x2 + Sx = x(1− x)(S − (T + S − 1)x) = 0,
which implies
x0 = 0, x1 = 1, x2 =
S
T + S − 1 .
7The condition 0 < x2 < 1 is equivalent to
S(S + T − 1) > 0 and (1− T )(S + T − 1) < 0,
which is satisfied in the SD-game and the SH-game but is violated in the PD-game and the H-
game. In the SD-game S + T > 1 and 0 = x1 < x2 < 1 = x1, thus x2 is stable and x0 and x1
are unstable. In the SH-game, S + T < 1 and 0 = x1 < x2 < 1 = x1, thus x2 is unstable, x1 and
x3 are stable. The PD-game and the H-game have only two equilibria: for the PD-game x0 = 0
(stable) and x1 = 1 (unstable), for the H-game: x0 = 0 (unstable) and x1 = 1 (stable).
General games. Now we consider a general two-player two-strategy game where there is no
ranking on the coefficients. An equilibrium point is a root x ∈ (0, 1) of the cubic on the right-hand
side of (6)(
a12 + a21 − a11 − a22
)
x3 +
(
a11 − a21 − 2(a12 − a22) + q(a22 + a12 − a11 − a21)
)
x2
+
(
a12 − a22 + q(a21 − a12 − 2a22)
)
x+ qa22 = 0
We define t := x1−x . Dividing the above equation by (1− x)3 and using the relation 11−x = 1 + t,
the above equation can be written in t-variable as
P3(t) = −a11qt3 + (a12 − a21 + q(a21q − a11 − a12))t2 + (a12 − a22 + q(a21 + a22 − a12))t+ a22q
:= at3 + bt2 + ct+ d.
The number of equilibria of the 2 × 2-game is equal to the number of positive roots of the cubic
P3. Applying Sturm’s theorem, see for instance [Stu02, Theorem 1.4], to the polynomial P3 for
the interval (0,+∞), where the sign at +∞ of a polynomial is the same as the sign of its leading
coefficient, we obtain the following result
Lemma 2.3. Let s1 and s2 be respectively the number of changes of signs in the following sequences{
d, c,
bc− 9ad
a
,∆
}
,{
a,
b2 − 3ac
a
,∆
}
,
where ∆ := a
(
18abcd − 4b3d + b2c2 − 4ac3 − 27a2d2) denotes the radicand. Then P3 has exactly
s1 − s2 number of positive roots. As consequences
(i) P3 has three distinct real positive roots (thus the game has 3 equilibria) if and only if
∆ > 0,
ab < 0,
ac > 0,
ad < 0.
(ii) If there is no change of sign in the sequence of polynomial’s coefficients then there is no
positive root. That is if 
ab > 0
bc > 0
cd > 0
then P3 has no positive root (thus the game has no equilibria).
8Remark 2.4. In this remark we show that in the case q = n−1n the point x = (1/n, . . . , 1/n) is
always an equilibrium of the general replicator-mutator dynamics regardless of the type of games
and of the payoff functions. In fact, since q = n−1n , we have
qji =
q
n− 1 =
1
n
, qii = 1− q = 1
n
.
Substituting this into the formula of gi in (1) we obtain
gi(x) =
1
n
n∑
j=1
xjfj(x)− xif¯(x) = (1/n− xi)f¯(x).
Thus the replicator-mutator dynamics always has an uniform equilibrium x = (1/n, . . . , 1/n), see
[PCNeL12] for the bifurcation analysis of this equilibrium point for the case d = 2 and n ≥ 3.
2.3 Muti-player games
In this section, we focus on the replicator-mutator equation for d-player two-strategy games
with a symmetric mutation matrix Q = (qji) (with j, i ∈ {1, 2}) so that
q11 = q22 = 1− q and q12 = q21 = q,
for some constant 0 ≤ q ≤ 1/2. Note that this is a direct consequence of Equation (3) and is
not an additional restriction/assumption. Let x be the frequency of S1. Thus the frequency of
S2 is 1 − x. The interaction of the individuals in the population is in randomly selected groups
of d participants, that is, they play and obtain their fitness from d-player games. Let ak (resp.,
bk) be the payoff of an S1-strategist (resp., S2) in a group containing other k S1 strategists (i.e.
d− 1− k S2 strategists). Here we consider symmetric games where the payoffs do not depend on
the ordering of the players. In this case, the average payoffs of S1 and S2 are, respectively
f1(x) =
d−1∑
k=0
ak
(
d− 1
k
)
xk(1− x)d−1−k and f2(x) =
d−1∑
k=0
bk
(
d− 1
k
)
xk(1− x)d−1−k. (12)
The replicator-mutator equation (1) then becomes
x˙ = xf1(x)(1− q) + (1− x)f2(x)q − x(xf1(x) + (1− x)f2(x))
= q
[
(1− x)f2(x)− xf1(x)
]
+ x(1− x)(f1(x)− f2(x)). (13)
Note that when q = 0 we recover the usual replicator equation (i.e. without mutation). In contrast
to the replicator equation, x = 0 and x = 1 are no longer equilibrium points of the system for
q 6= 0. In addition, according to Remark 2.4 if q = 12 then x = 12 is always an equilibrium point.
Equilibrium points are those points 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 that make the right-hand side of (13) vanish,
that is
q
[
(1− x)f2(x)− xf1(x)
]
+ x(1− x)(f1(x)− f2(x)) = 0. (14)
Using (12), Eq. (14) becomes
q
[ d−1∑
k=0
bk
(
d− 1
k
)
xk(1− x)d−k −
d−1∑
k=0
ak
(
d− 1
k
)
xk+1(1− x)d−1−k
]
+
d−1∑
k=0
βk
(
d− 1
k
)
xk+1(1− x)d−k = 0, (15)
9where βk := ak− bk. Now setting t := x1−x then dividing (15) by (1−x)d+1 and using the relation
that (1 + t) = 11−x , we obtain
q(1 + t)
[ d−1∑
k=0
bk
(
d− 1
k
)
tk −
d−1∑
k=0
ak
(
d− 1
k
)
tk+1
]
+
d−1∑
k=0
βk
(
d− 1
k
)
tk+1 = 0. (16)
By regrouping terms and changing the sign, we obtain the following polynomial equation in t-
variable
P (t) :=
d+1∑
k=0
ckt
k = 0, (17)
where the coefficient ck for k = 0, · · · , d+ 1 is given by
ck :=

−qb0 for k = 0,
(q − 1)(a0 − b0)− q(d− 1)b1 for k = 1,
qak−2
(
d− 1
k − 2
)
+ (q − 1)(ak−1 − bk−1)
(
d− 1
k − 1
)
− qbk
(
d− 1
k
)
for k = 2, . . . , d− 1,
(q − 1)(ad−1 − bd−1) + qad−2(d− 1) for k = d,
qad−1 for k = d+ 1.
(18)
Thus the number of equilibria of d-player two-strategy games is the same as the number of positive
roots of the polynomial P . We now use Decartes’ rule of signs to count the latter. Let c :=
{c0, c1, . . . , cd+1} be the sequence of coefficients given in (18). Applying Decartes’ rule of signs we
obtain the following result.
Lemma 2.5. The number of positive roots of P , which is also the number of equilibria of the
d-player two-strategy replicator-mutator dynamics, is either equal to the number of sign changes
of c or is less than it by an even amount.
In [PLN14], the author has employed a similar approach to study the number of equilibria for
the standard replicator dynamics, in which P turns out to be a Bernstein polynomial and many
useful properties of Bernstein polynomials were exploited. In the following remark we show that
the polynomial P can also be written in the form of a Bernstein polynomial.
Remark 2.6. Using the identities B.4 and B.5 in [PLN15] we can write q[(1− x)f2(x)− xf1(x)]
as a polynomial in Bernstein form of degree d (call it P1(x)), and similarly x(1−x)(f1(x)− f2(x))
as a polynomial in Bernstein form of degree d+ 1 (call it P2(x)), as follows
P1(x) = q[(1− x)f2(x)− xf1(x)] = q
(
d∑
k=0
bk(d− k)− kak−1
d
(
d
k
)
xk(1− x)d−k
)
,
P2(x) = x(1− x)(f1(x)− f2(x)) =
d+1∑
k=0
k(d+ 1− k)(ak−1 − bk−1)
d(d+ 1)
(
d+ 1
k
)
xk(1− x)d+1−k.
Using the following identity, obtained by multiplying the polynomial by ((1− x) + x),
d∑
k=0
ck
(
d
k
)
xk(1− x)d+1−k =
d+1∑
k=0
(d+ 1− k)ck + kck−1
d+ 1
(
d+ 1
k
)
xk(1− x)d+1−k,
we have
P1(x) = q
( d+1∑
k=0
(d+ 1− k)[(d− k)bk − kak−1] + k[bk−1(d+ 1− k)− (k − 1)ak−2]
d(d+ 1)
×
(
d+ 1
k
)
xk(1− x)d+1−k
)
.
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Combining the above computations, we have converted P1(x) + P2(x) into a polynomial in Bern-
stein form
P1(x) + P2(x) =
1
d(d+ 1)
d+1∑
k=0
ρk
(
d+ 1
k
)
xk(1− x)d+1−k,
where
ρk = k(d+ 1− k)(ak−1 − bk−1) + q
(
(d+ 1− k)[(d− k)bk − kak−1]
+ k[bk−1(d+ 1− k)− (k − 1)ak−2]
)
= q(d+ 1− k)(d− k)bk + (1− q)(d+ 1− k)k(ak−1 − bk−1)− qk(k − 1)ak−2.
Direct computations show that (note that we have changed the sign of ck for notation convenience
in the subsequent sections)
ρk = −ckd(d+ 1)(
d+ 1
k
)
.
Having written P in the form of a Bernstein polynomial, similar general results on the equilibrium
points of the replicator-mutator dynamics as in [PLN14] could be, in principle, obtained using the
link between the sign pattern of the sequence ρ = {ρ0, . . . , ρd+1} and the sign pattern and number
of roots of the polynomial P . We do not go into further details here and leave this interesting
topic for future research.
For a (real) polynomial P we denote by S(P ) the number of changes of signs in the sequence
of coefficients of P disregarding zeros and by R(P ) the number of positive roots of P counted with
multiplicities. Decartes’ rule of signs only provides an upper bound for R(P ) in terms of S(P ).
Recently it has been shown that R(P ) can be computed exactly as S(PQ) for some polynomial Q
or as a limit of S((t+ 1)nP (t)) as n tends to infinity.
Theorem 2.7. [Av10] Let P be a non-zero real polynomial.
(i) There exists a real polynomial Q with all non-negative coefficients such that S(PQ) = R(P ).
(ii) The sequence S((t+ 1)nP (t)) is monotone decreasing with limit equal to R(P ).
The polynomial Q in part (i) involves all the roots of P (even the imaginary ones), which are
not known in general, hence part (i) is practically inefficient. The sequence {S((t + 1)nP (t))}n
can be easily computed, but it only can be used for approximating R(P ). Note that for P (t) =
cd+1t
d+1 + . . .+ c1t+ c0, we have
(t+ 1)nP (t) =
n∑
j=0
d+1∑
i=0
ci
(
n
j
)
ti+j =
n+d+1∑
k=0
d+1∑
i=0
ci
(
n
k − i
)
tk.
Thus thus k-th coefficient of (t+ 1)nP (t) is
akn =
d+1∑
i=0
ci
(
n
k − i
)
. (19)
Corollary 2.8. Let sn be the number of changes of signs in the sequence {akn}n+d+1k=0 defined in
(19). Then the number N of equlibria of a d-player two-strategy game is
N = R(P ) = lim
n→∞ sn. (20)
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Figure 1: Plot of sn for some randomly chosen payoff matrices (we adopted q = 0.1 in
all cases). We indicate the number players d in the game, the payoff matrix used for small d (for
the sake of representation given large sizes of the payoff matrices for large d), and the number
of internal equilibria, N . For sufficiently large n, sn decreasingly converges to the corresponding
value of N .
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Corollary 2.8 provides us with a simple method to calculate the number of equilibria, N , for
a given d-player two-strategy game. In Figure 1, we show a number of examples. The value of n
such that sn reaches N varies significantly for different games and is usually (very) large. It would
be an interesting problem to find the smallest value of n satisfying sn = N . An upper-bound for
such n is also helpful. This is still an open problem [Av10]. However, in the particular case when
P has no positive root, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2.9. [PR01] Let P (t) = cd+1x
d+1+ . . .+c1t+c0. If R(P ) = 0 then S((t+1)
n0P (t)) = 0
where
n0 =

(
d+ 1
2
) max0≤i≤d+1 {ci/(d+ 1i
)}
minλ∈[0,1]
{
(1− λ)d+1f( λ1−λ )
} − d− 1
 .
Corollary 2.10. If S((t+ 1)n0P (t)) ≥ 1 then R(P ) ≥ 1.
3 Properties of equilibrium points: random games
In this section we study random games. For two-player social dilemma games, we calculate
the probability of having a certain number of equilibria when S and T are uniformly distributed.
For multi-player games, we compute the expected number of equilibria when the payoff entries are
normally distributed.
3.1 Probability of having a certain number of equilibria in social dilemma
games
We consider two-player social dilemma games in Section 2.2 but T and S are now random
variables uniformly distributed in the corresponding intervals. In this section, pGk , where G ∈
{SD,H, SH,PD} and k ∈ {1, 2, 3}, denotes the probability of a game G having k equilibria.
According to the analysis of Section 2.2, all of the games have at least one equilibrium at the
origin. In addition, the SD-game always has two equilibria, that is
pSD1 = p
SD
3 = 0, p
SD
2 = 1.
We also know that the H-game has either 1 or 2 equilibria. The probability that it has 1 equilibrium
is smaller than the probability that S + T = 1. Since S + T has a continuous density function, it
implies that pH1 = 0. Thus we also have
pH1 = p
H
3 = 0, p
H
2 = 1.
For the SH-game and PD-game, we are able to calculate the probability of having two equilibria
explicitly since its condition on T and S is simple which depends only on a convex combination
of T and S. The conditions on S and T for these games to have 1 equilibrium or 3 equilibria are
much more complex since they involve ∆ defined in (10), which is a nonlinear function of S and
T .
SH-game. Suppose that S ∼ U([−1, 0]), T ∼ U([0, 1]). Then
qT ∼ U([0, q]), fqT (x) =
{
1
q if 0 ≤ x ≤ q,
0 otherwise
;
(1− q)S ∼ U([q − 1, 0]), f(1−q)S(y) =
{
1
(1−q) if q − 1 ≤ y ≤ 0,
0 otherwise.
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We now compute pSH2 explicitly. The probability that the SH-game has two equilibria, p
SH
2 , is
the probability that h(0)h(1) < 0. Since h(1) < 0 we have
pSH2 = Prob(h(0) > 0) = Prob(qT + S(1− q) > 0) =
∫ ∞
0
fSHZ (x) dx, (21)
where fSHZ is the probability density function of the random variable Z := qT + (1− q)S, which
is given by
fSHZ (x) = (fqT ∗ f(1−q)S)(x) =
∫ ∞
−∞
fqT (x− y)f(1−q)S(y) dy
=
1
1− q
∫ 0
q−1
fqT (x− y) dy
(∗)
=
1
1− q

∫ x
q−1
1
q dy if q − 1 ≤ x ≤ 2q − 1,∫ x
x−q
1
q dy if 2q − 1 ≤ x ≤ 0,∫ 0
x−q
1
q dy if 0 ≤ x ≤ q,
0 otherwise
=
1
1− q

x+1−q
q if q − 1 ≤ x ≤ 2q − 1,
1 if 2q − 1 ≤ x ≤ 0,
q−x
q if 0 ≤ x ≤ q,
0 otherwise.
Note that to obtain (∗), we use the fact that fqT (x−y) is 1/q if 0 ≤ x−y ≤ q and is zero otherwise.
Thus the domain of the integral is restricted to
D = {(x, y) : q − 1 ≤ y ≤ 0 & 0 ≤ x− y ≤ q},
which gives rise to the cases in (∗). Substituting the formula of fZ into (21) we obtain
pSH2 =
∫ ∞
0
fSHZ (x) dx =
1
1− q
∫ q
0
q − x
q
dx =
q
2(1− q) .
It follows that q 7→ pSH2 is an increasing function. We plot this function in Figure 2.
PD-game. Suppose that T ∼ U([1, 2]) and S ∼ U([−1, 0]). Then
qT ∼ U([q, 2q]), fqT =
{
1
q if q ≤ x ≤ 2q,
0 otherwise;
(1− q)S ∼ U([q − 1, 0]), f(1−q)S(y) =
{
1
(1−q) if q − 1 ≤ y ≤ 0,
0 otherwise.
Similarly as in (21) we have
pPD2 =
∫ ∞
0
fPDZ (x) dx,
where fPDZ is the probability density function of Z = qT +(1− q)S. To calculate this function, we
need to consider two different cases 0 < q ≤ 1/3 (hence q−1 ≤ −2q ≤ −q < 0) and 1/3 ≤ q ≤ 1/2
14
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Figure 2: Probability of having two equilibrium points for Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD)
and Stag Hunt (SH) games, according to analytical results obtained in Section 3. Both
functions are increasing; pPD2 is always bigger than p
SD
2 ; the maximum of p
PD
2 is 1 while the
maximum of pSD2 is 1/2. These results also corroborate the simulation results using samplings in
Figure 3.
(hence −2q ≤ q − 1 ≤ −q < 0). For 0 < q ≤ 1/3 we have
fPDZ (x) = (fqT ∗ f(1−q)S)(x) =
∫ ∞
−∞
fqT (x− y)f(1−q)S(y) dy
=
1
1− q
∫ 0
q−1
fqT (x− y) dy
=
1
1− q

∫ x−q
q−1
1
q dy if 2q − 1 ≤ x ≤ 3q − 1,∫ x−q
x−2q
1
q dy if 3q − 1 ≤ x ≤ q,∫ 0
x−2q
1
q dy if q ≤ x ≤ 2q,
0 otherwise
=
1
1− q

x+1−2q
q if 2q − 1 ≤ x ≤ 3q − 1,
1 if 3q − 1 ≤ x ≤ q,
2q−x
q if q ≤ x ≤ 2q,
0 otherwise
Hence for 0 ≤ q ≤ 1/3, we have
pPD2 =
∫ ∞
0
fPDZ (x) dx =
∫ q
0
fPDZ (x) dx+
∫ 2q
q
fPDZ (x) dx =
1
1− q
(∫ q
0
1 dx+
∫ 2q
q
2q − x
q
dx
)
=
3q
2(1− q) .
For 1/3 ≤ q ≤ 1/2, we have
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Figure 3: Probabilities of observing a certain number of equilibrium points for each
social dilemma game, for different mutation strengths, q. S and T are drawn from
uniform distributions. The results are averaged over sampling 106 pairs of S and T drawn from
the corresponding ranges in a social dilemma. All results are obtained using Mathematica.
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fPDZ (x) =
1
1− q
∫ 0
q−1
fqT (x− y) dy
=
1
1− q

∫ x−q
q−1
1
q dy if 2q − 1 ≤ x ≤ 3q − 1,∫ x−q
x−2q
1
q dy if 3q − 1 ≤ x ≤ q,∫ 0
x−2q
1
q dy if q ≤ x ≤ 2q,
0 otherwise
=
1
1− q

x+1−2q
q if 2q − 1 ≤ x ≤ 3q − 1,
1 if 3q − 1 ≤ x ≤ q,
2q−x
q if q ≤ x ≤ 2q,
0 otherwise
Hence for 1/3 ≤ q ≤ 1/2, we have
pPD2 =
∫ ∞
0
fPDZ (x) dx =
∫ 3q−1
0
fPDZ (x) dx+
∫ q
3q−1
fPDZ (x) dx+
∫ 2q
q
fPDZ (x) dx
=
1
1− q
(∫ 3q−1
0
x+ 1− 2q
q
dy +
∫ q
3q−1
1 dy +
∫ 2q
q
2q − x
q
)
= 3− 1
2q(1− q) .
In summary, we obtain
pPD2 =
{
3q
2(1−q) if 0 < q ≤ 1/3,
3− 12q(1−q) if 1/3 ≤ q ≤ 1/2.
It follows that q 7→ pPD2 is also increasing. We also plot this function in Figure 2. Moreover, in
Figure 3, we numerically compute the probability of having a certain number of equilibria for each
game by averaging over 106 samples of T and S. The numerical results are in accordance with the
analytical computations. In the H-game: p2 = 1 (hence p1 = p3 = 0) for all values of q. In the
SD-game: when q = 0, p3 = 1 (hence p1 = p2 = 0) but p2 = 1 (hence p1 = p3 = 0) for all q > 0.
In the PD-game: when q = 0, p2 = 1 (hence p1 = p3 = 0) but when 0 < q < 1/2 all p1, p2, p3
are positive although p3 is very small; p2 is increasing and attains its maximum 1 at q = 1/2.
In the SH-game: when q = 0, p3 = 1 (hence p1 = p2 = 0). When 0 < q < 1/2, the picture is
more diverse: all p1, p2 and p3 are non-negligible; p2 is increasing and attains its maximum 1/2 at
q = 1/2. Moreover, note that for q > 0, there is at least one equilibrium (x = 0) in all cases, where
the remaining ones are internal equilibria. To the contrary, when q = 0, PD and H games always
have two non-internal equilibria (at x = 0 and x = 1) while SH and SG games have three equilibria
(two non-internal and one internal). With mutation (q > 0), x = 1 is no longer an equilibrium in
all cases. Therefore, the SD-game has the same number of internal equilibria (one) while it gains
one more internal equilibrium in H game. In the PD-game, the probability of having at least one
internal equilibrium increases with q. In the SH-game, the probability of having two internal (i.e.
gaining one more compared to the no mutation case) is high. In short, except for the SD game,
introducing mutation leads to the probability of gaining an additional internal equilibrium (thus
increasing behavioural diversity) in all social dilemmas. This probability is 100% in the H-game,
increases with q in the PD-game (reaching 100% when q = 0.5) and is roughly 40-60% in the
SH-game.
3.2 Expected number of equilibria of multi-player two strategy games
We recall that finding an equilibrium point of the replicator-mutator dynamics for d-player
two-strategy games is equivalent to finding a positive root of the polynomial (17) with coefficients
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given in (18). In this section, by employing techniques from random polynomial theory, we provide
explicit formulas for the computation of the expected number of internal equilibrium points of the
replicator-mutator dynamics where the entries of the payoff matrix are random variables, thus
extending our previous results for the replicator dynamics [DH15, DH16, DTH19, DTH18]. We
will apply the following result on the expected number of positive roots of a general random
polynomial.
Theorem 3.1. [EK95, Theorem 3.1] Consider a random polynomial
Q(x) =
n∑
i=0
αkx
k,
where {αk}0≤k≤n are the elements of a multivariate normal distribution with mean zero and co-
variance matrix C. Then the expected number of positive roots of Q is given by
EQ =
1
pi
∫ ∞
0
( ∂2
∂x∂y
(
log v(x)TCv(y)
)∣∣
y=x=t
) 1
2
dt, (22)
where
v(x) =

1
x
...
xn
 , v(y) =

1
y
...
yn
 .
Defining
H(x, y) =
n∑
i,j=0
Cijx
iyj , M(t) = H(t, t), A(t) = ∂2xyH(x, y)|y=x=t, B(t) = ∂xH(x, y)|y=x=t,
then EQ can be written as
EQ =
1
pi
∫ ∞
0
√
A(t)M(t)−B(t)2
M(t)
dt. (23)
We now apply Theorem 3.1 to the random polynomial P given in (17) and obtain formulas for
the expected number of equilibria of the replicator-mutator dynamics for d-player two-strategy
games. It turns out that the case q = 0.5 needs special treatment since according to Remark 2.4
x = 1/2 is always an equilibrium point.
3.2.1 The case q 6= 0.5
Suppose that ak and bk are independent standard normally distributed random variables
with mean zero. Then, for q 6= 12 , the random vector c = {c0, . . . , cd+1} defined in (18) has a
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(symmetric) covariance matrix C = (Cij)0≤i,j≤d+1 given by
Ckk =

q2 for k = 0,
2(q − 1)2 + q2(d− 1)2 for k = 1,
q2
(
d− 1
k − 2
)2
+ 2(q − 1)2
(
d− 1
k − 1
)2
+ q2
(
d− 1
k
)2
for k = 2, . . . , d− 1,
2(q − 1)2 + q2(d− 1)2 for k = d,
q2 for k = d+ 1;
Ckk+1 =

q(q − 1) for k = 0,
q(q − 1) + q(q − 1)(d− 1)2 for k = 1,
q(q − 1)
(
d− 1
k − 1
)2
+ q(q − 1)
(
d− 1
k
)2
for k = 2, . . . , d− 2,
q(q − 1)(d− 1)2 + q(q − 1) for k = d− 1,
q(q − 1) for k = d;
Cij = 0 for 0 ≤ i < j ≤ d+ 1 : j − i ≥ 2.
Using the convention that whenever k < 0 or k > n then
(
n
k
)
= 0, we can simplify C as
Ckk = q
2
(
d− 1
k − 2
)2
+ 2(q − 1)2
(
d− 1
k − 1
)2
+ q2
(
d− 1
k
)2
for k = 0, . . . , d+ 1, (24)
Ckk+1 = q(q − 1)
(
d− 1
k − 1
)2
+ q(q − 1)
(
d− 1
k
)2
, for k = 0, . . . , d, (25)
Cij = 0 for 0 ≤ i < j ≤ d+ 1 : j − i ≥ 2. (26)
Applying Theorem 3.1 we obtain the following result.
Proposition 3.2. Suppose that ak and bk are independent standard normally distributed random
variables with mean zero and that q 6= 0.5. We define
H(x, y) =
d+1∑
k=0
Ckkx
kyk +
d∑
k=0
Ckk+1(x
kyk+1 + xk+1yk),
M(t) = H(t, t), A(t) = ∂2xyH(x, y)
∣∣
y=x=t
, B(t) = ∂xH(x, y)
∣∣
y=x=t
,
where the coefficient Cij , 0 ≤ i, j ≤ d + 1 are given in (24), (25) and (26). Then the expected
number of equilibria of a d-player two-strategy replicator-mutator dynamics is given by
E =
1
pi
∫ ∞
0
√
A(t)M(t)−B2(t)
M(t)
dt.
3.2.2 The case q = 0.5
The case q = 0.5 needs to be treated differently since in this case, according to Remark 2.4,
x = 1/2 is always an equilibrium. Other equilibrium points are roots of the average fitness of the
whole population f¯(x) = 0 due to Remark 2.4, that is
0 = f¯(x) = xf1(x)+(1−x)f2(x) (12)=
d−1∑
k=0
ak
(
d− 1
k
)
xk+1(1−x)d−1−k+
d−1∑
k=0
bk
(
d− 1
k
)
xk(1−x)d−k.
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Figure 4: (Left panel) Analytical vs. simulation sampling results of the average number
of internal equilibrium points (E) for varying q and for different values of d. The solid lines are
generated from analytical (A) formulas of E. The solid diamonds capture simulation (S) results
obtained by averaging over 106 samples of the payoff entries (normal distribution). Analytical and
simulations results are in accordance with each other. (Right panel) Plot of E for increasing d
and for different values of q. In general, E increases with d. E is always larger when q > 0 than
when q = 0. Also, E is largest when q is close to 0 (i.e. rare mutation). All results are obtained
using Mathematica.
Since x = 1 is not a solution, by dividing the right-hand side of the above equation by (1 − x)d,
and let t := x1−x then we obtain the following equation
P (t) =
d−1∑
k=0
ak
(
d− 1
k
)
tk+1 +
d−1∑
k=0
bk
(
d− 1
k
)
tk
=
d∑
k=0
[
ak−1
(
d− 1
k − 1
)
+ bk
(
d− 1
k
)]
tk
=:
d∑
k=0
ckt
k,
where
ck = ak−1
(
d− 1
k − 1
)
+ bk
(
d− 1
k
)
, for k = 0, . . . , d.
Suppose that ak and bk are independent standard normally distributed random variables with
mean zero. Then the random vector c = {c0, . . . , cd+1} has a (symmetric) covariance matrix
C = (Cij)0≤i,j≤d+1 given by
Cij =
((
d− 1
k − 1
)2
+
(
d− 1
k
)2)
δij ,
where δij is the Kronecker delta. Applying Theorem 3.1 and noticing that x = 1/2 is always an
equilibrium, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 3.3. Suppose that ak and bk are independent standard normally distributed random
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Figure 5: Plot of log(E)/log(d + 1) for varying d. For different values of q, this quantity
converges to the same value. All results are obtained using Mathematica.
variables with mean zero and that q = 0.5. We define
H(x, y) =
d∑
k=0
((
d− 1
k − 1
)2
+
(
d− 1
k
)2)
xkyk,
M(t) = H(t, t), A(t) = ∂2xyH(x, y)
∣∣
y=x=t
, B(t) = ∂xH(x, y)
∣∣
y=x=t
,
Then the expected number of equilibria of a d-player two-strategy replicator-mutator dynamics is
given by
E = 1 +
1
pi
∫ ∞
0
√
A(t)M(t)−B2(t)
M(t)
dt.
In Figure 4 we show that the results obtain from analytical formulas of E corroborate with
those obtained from numerical simulations by averaging over a large number of randomly generated
payoff matrices. Figure 4 also reveals that the expected number of equilibria exhibits several
interesting behaviours. We will elaborate more on this point in Section 4.
4 Conclusion and outlook
Understanding equilibrium properties of the replicator-mutator dynamics for multi-player
multi-strategy games is a difficult problem due to its complexity: to find an equilibrium, one needs
to solve a system of multivariate polynomials. In this paper, employing techniques from classical
and random polynomial theory, we study the number of equilibria for both deterministic and
random two-strategy games. For deterministic games, using Decartes’ rule of signs and its recent
developments, we provide a method to compute the number of equilibria via the sign changes of
the coefficients of a polynomial. For two-player social dilemma games, we compute the probability
of observing a certain number of equilibria when the payoff entries are uniformly distributed. For
multi-player two-strategy random games whose payoffs are independently distributed according to
a normal distribution, we obtain explicit formulas to compute the expected number of equilibria
by relating it to the expected number of positive roots of a random polynomial. We also perform
numerical simulations to compare with and to illustrate our analytical results. We observe that
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E is always larger in the presence of mutation (i.e. when q > 0) than when mutation is absent
(i.e. when q = 0), implying that mutation leads to larger behavioural diversity in a dynamical
system (see again Figure 4). Interestingly, E is largest when q is close to 0 (i.e. rare mutation),
rather than when it is large. In general, our findings might have important implications for
the understanding of social and biological diversities, where biological mutations and behavioural
errors are present, i.e. in the study of evolution of cooperative behaviour and population fitness
distribution [Lev00a, Pen˜12, SPLP12]. Furthermore, numerical simulations also suggest a number
of open problems that we leave for future work.
Asymptotic behaviour of the expected number of equilibria when the number of players tends
to infinity. In [DH16], we proved that
lim
d→∞
lnE(d)
ln(d− 1) =
1
2
, (27)
where E(d) is the expected number of internal equilibria of the replicator dynamics for d-player
two-strategy games, in which the payoff entries are randomly distributed. To obtain (27), we
utilized several useful connections to Legendre’s polynomials. In Figure 5, we plot lnE(q,d)ln(d+1) , where
E(q, d) is the expected number of equilibria for the replicator-mutator dynamics, as a function of
d for various values of q. We observe that they all converge to the same limit as d tends to infinity,
but in different manner: for q = 0, it increasingly approaches the limit while for q > 0 sufficiently
small, at first they are decreasing and then for sufficiently large d, they also increasingly approach
to the limit. Thus, it is expected that there is a phase transition. Proving this rigorously would
be an interesting problem. The method used in [DH16] seems not to be working since there is no
direct connections to Legendre’s polynomials.
Asymptotic behaviour of the expected number of equilibria when the mutation tends to zero.
The classical replicator dynamics is obtained from the replicator-mutator dynamics by setting the
mutation to be zero. Thus it is a natural question to ask how a certain quantity (such as the
expected number of equilibria) behaves when the mutation tends to zero. Both Figures 4 and 5
demonstrate that the expected number of equilibria changes significantly when the mutation is
turned on. In addition, using explicit formulas of the probability of observing two equilibria for
the SH-game and the PD-game obtained in Section 3, we clearly see a jump when q approaches
zero:
lim
q→0
pq,SH,PD2 = 0 6= 1 = p0,SH,PD2 .
Both observations suggest that these quantities exhibit singular behaviour at q = 0. Characterizing
this behaviour would be a challenging problem for future work.
Bifurcation phenomena of the replicator-mutator dynamics for multi-player games.
In [PCNeL12], the authors proved Hopf bifurcations for the replicator-mutator dynamics with
d = 2 and n ≥ 3 and characterized the existence of stable limit cycles using an analytical derivation
of the Hopf bifurcations points and the corresponding first Lyapunov coefficients. In addition, they
also showed that the limiting behaviors are tied to the structure of the fitness model. Another
interesting topic for further research would be to extend the results of [PCNeL12] to multi-player
games.
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